A fundamental DNS design flaw and permissive sharing defaults in SpaceXSI's Grok Build "vibe-coding" platform have exposed 35,578 live user-generated web applications—including 24 internal tools built by SpaceXSI and X staff—to anyone querying public passive DNS databases, according to security research published November 10, 2026 by Claroc.
Testing 43,551 web addresses hosted under SpaceXSI's `grok.me` publishing domain on November 8, Claroc co-founder and CTO Asaf Aprozper and his research team found 37,571 active endpoints—and confirmed that 35,578 of them, or 94.7%, loaded completely unauthenticated from an incognito browser. Ironically, the exposed apps included SpaceXSI's own enterprise sales onboarding plans, territory maps covering 594 corporate accounts, X advertising proposals, and brand safety playbooks, alongside medical records, defense-contractor rosters, and corporate financial trackers from 30 identifiable external organizations.
### Why Subdomain Links Shattered 'Security Through Obscurity'
The root failure behind what Claroc terms "GhostShares" lies in how Grok Build structures capability URLs when users convert chat prompts into shareable web apps. Rather than placing a random token inside the URL path after a slash—where HTTPS encryption shields paths from network observers—Grok Build embedded four random "dice words" carrying roughly 38 bits of entropy into the *hostname* to the left of `.grok.me`.
Because DNS queries and TLS handshake Server Name Indication (SNI) headers traverse network infrastructure in plaintext, passive DNS sensors automatically harvest newly resolved subdomains the moment a creator or recipient visits an app. What Grok Build presented as an unguessable "anyone with the link" secret became trivially enumerable from public DNS telemetry without brute-forcing a single word.
Compounding that network leak, Claroc documented in [its primary GhostShares 2 report](https://blog.claroc.io/ghostshares-grok-build-apps/) that Grok Build defaulted publishing prompts to "Anyone with the link." Worse still, when researchers built a test team app with Grok's suggested "Continue with Google" authentication flow, the generated access logic allowed *any* valid Google account to read, modify, and delete application records rather than restricting access to a company workspace.
### From SpaceXSI Sales Playbooks to Defense Contractors and Medical Records
Across the 35,578 open applications, Claroc estimated that roughly 2% contained material severe enough to warrant high or critical risk ratings—affecting six Fortune 500 enterprises and 26 organizations with more than 1,000 employees. Reporting by [Ars Technica](https://arstechnica.com/security/2026/11/grok-build-coding-agent-leaks-oodles-of-confidential-info-some-belonging-to-spacexsi/) and [Engadget](https://www.engadget.com/2313187/grok-build-leaked-sensitive-spacexsi-data/) highlighted how casually employees across sectors uploaded sensitive spreadsheets into AI-generated dashboards:
- **SpaceXSI and X internal tools:** Twenty-four open corporate apps exposed an enterprise sales onboarding guide naming 19 internal chat channels and internal tool endpoints, a 594-account territory map, eight X advertising proposals (including one marked confidential for a U.S. federal agency), four live advertiser account boards, and two copies of an X brand safety playbook.
- **Healthcare and occupational data:** A Peruvian construction firm exposed 3,784 worker medical exams; a healthcare organization left a 3,565-person hospital staff roster open; and another app surfaced an intensive-care patient's laboratory results.
- **Defense, automotive, and enterprise infrastructure:** Exposed apps revealed a 108-person roster on a U.S. Navy ship engineering logistics contract, explosive-building loading procedures at a U.S. plant operated by a Norwegian-Finnish aerospace and defense group, a Tesla service-center productivity and bonus scorecard naming 22 technicians, luxury cruise crew IDs, and 4,000 auto-transport orders with profit margins.
### Asymmetric Containment and the Shadow-AI Governance Gap
Claroc notified SpaceXSI privately on November 8, receiving no response until researchers tagged executives on social media and *Ars Technica* followed up ahead of publication. Within hours of media inquiries, SpaceXSI pulled down all 24 of its own corporate apps—returning "app not found" errors—while asserting that employee builds start private by default.
Yet SpaceXSI left tens of thousands of third-party customer applications online, leaving Claroc to contact affected CISOs directly—one luxury cruise line immediately mobilized its security team upon notification. Together with [recent state enforcement actions over agentic sandbox breaches](https://www.mushimu.com/post/9424) and [autonomous hacking frameworks](https://www.mushimu.com/post/9417), the Grok Build spill illustrates a recurring blind spot in "vibe-coding" tools: when non-technical staff spin up internal apps inside consumer-style chat windows instead of vetted enterprise software, permissive sharing defaults and DNS-visible subdomains turn routine AI productivity into an unmonitored corporate data exfiltration channel.
### Sources & Further Reading
- [Ars Technica (US — Security Investigation & Vendor Response)](https://arstechnica.com/security/2026/11/grok-build-coding-agent-leaks-oodles-of-confidential-info-some-belonging-to-spacexsi/)
- [Claroc Research Blog (Primary Technical Disclosure — GhostShares 2)](https://blog.claroc.io/ghostshares-grok-build-apps/)
- [Engadget (US — Enterprise Exposure Breakdown)](https://www.engadget.com/2313187/grok-build-leaked-sensitive-spacexsi-data/)
~AI ~Cybersecurity ~Grok ~SpaceXSI ~DataLeak